...The economic problems that the payments brought, and German resentment at their imposition are usually cited as one of the more significant factors that led to the end of the Weimar Republic and the beginning of the dictatorship of Adolf Hitler. The British economist John Maynard Keynes in his best-selling 1919 book The Economic Consequences of the Peace argued that reparations threatened to destabilize the German economy, and hence German politics. The majority of historians, such as the Canadian historian Margaret MacMillan in her 2001 book Peacemakers: The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and Its Attempt to End War, have since disagreed with this assertion. The French economist Étienne Mantoux in his 1946 book The Carthaginian Peace, or the Economic Consequences of Mr. Keynes established that Germany could have paid all of the reparations had they wanted to, and that the problem was not the Germans were unable to pay, but rather that they were unwilling to pay[7] The American historian Sally Marks commented that Keynes had fallen in love with Carl Melchior, a member of the German delegation, and that views on reparations "...were shaped by his passion for Carl Melchior, the German financier and reparations expert whom he met during negotiations at Spa shortly after the armistice"[8]...
Õîòÿ åñòü è ïðîòèâîïîëîæíûå ìíåíèÿ
:
Also of note are the ideas of the British historian A. J. P. Taylor from his 1961 book The Origins of the Second World War, in which he claims that the settlement had been too indecisive: it was harsh enough to be seen as punitive, without being crippling enough to prevent Germany regaining its big power status, and can thus be blamed for the rise of the Reich under Hitler within decades[31].
È êîå î ÷¸ì îí çàáûë, íó òàê, ìåëî÷ü êàêàÿ-òî - ìèðîâîé ôèíàíñîâûé êðèçèñ 1929 ãîäà
:
...The economy continued to perform reasonably well until the foreign investments funding the economy, and the loans funding reparations payments, were suddenly withdrawn with the Stock Market Crash of 1929. This collapse was magnified by the volume of loans provided to German companies by US lenders. Even the reduced payments of the Dawes plan were primarily financed through a large volume of international loans. From 1924 onward German officials were "virtually flooded with loan offers by foreigners." [30] When these debts suddenly came due it was as if years of reparations payments were compressed into a few short weeks....
È òî ÷òî Ãåðìàíèÿ âûïëà÷èâàëà ðåïàðàöèè â îñíîâíîì èñïîëüçóÿ àìåðèêàíñêèå ññóäû êîòîðûå - Âàõ! êàê íåîæèäàííî ïðåêðàòèëèñü â 1929....
:
Under the Hoover Moratorium of June 1931 issued by the American president Herbert Hoover, which was designed to deal with the world-wide financial crisis caused by the bankruptcy of the Creditanstalt in May 1931, Germany ceased paying reparations[42]. At the Lausanne Conference of June 1932, reparations were formally cancelled[43]. Marks calculates that between 1921 and 1931, Germany paid a total of 20 billion marks in reparations, most of which came from American loans that the Germans repudiated in 1932[10]. In this way, the Germans largely escaped paying for World War I, and instead shifted the costs onto American investors[10]. The American historian Gerhard Weinberg commented about the way the Germans used reparations to avoid paying the costs of World War I that "The shifting of the burden of reparations from her shoulders to those of her enemies served to accentuate this disparity" in the economic strength of the Allies, which struggled to pay their heavy World War I debts and the other costs of the war and Germany, which paid neither reparations nor its World War I debts[10].
Íî ãëàâíîå â àññóæäåíèÿõ Êàëóæñêîãî - ýòî ïðîñòîòà è îäíîçíà÷íîñòü. Îáëîæèëè Ãåðìàíèþ íåïîìåðíûìè ðåïàðàöèÿìè - ê âëàñòè ïðèø¸ë Ãèòëåð.
Âàõ êàê ïðîñòî! _________________ A la guerre comme a la guerre èëè âòîðàÿ ðåäàêöèÿ Çàáóãîðíîâà
FAQ
