пїЅпїЅпїЅпїЅпїЅпїЅпїЅ пїЅ пїЅпїЅ

[Zabougornov]

http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1095518.html
IDF was warned of kidnap plots day before Shalit seized
By Amos Harel and Nir Hasson
Tags: IDF, Hamas, Gilad Shalit

"Terrorist elements intend to carry out a quality operation in the immediate future, most likely in the area of the southern Gaza Strip, with emphasis on the area between Sufa and Kerem Shalom [two border crossings]. The nature of the operation is unclear, but it may involve penetration of the [border fence], an assault against a position near the fence or against a [border] crossing in the southern Strip, a tunnel full of explosives or an attack inside Israel."

This was the warning that Military Intelligence relayed to the Gaza Division, on the basis of intelligence collected by the Shin Bet security service, on June 24, 2006, a day before the attack that resulted in the abduction of Gilad Shalit. The warning was for a 14-kilometer stretch of fence along the Gaza-Israel border, and narrowed previous intelligence warnings that had accumulated over the last two months.

On the basis of this warning, defensive preparations were stepped up. But no offensive preventive measures were taken, because at that time, less than a year after the disengagement from Gaza, the prevailing doctrine was for Israel to avoid offensive operations in the Strip.
Advertisement
The details of the intelligence warning appear in debriefings about Shalit's abduction that were carried out by the GOC Southern Command, and of which Haaretz has obtained copies. The attack and abduction were investigated at various command levels, including a committee appointed then chief of staff Dan Halutz, which was headed by Maj. Gen. (res.) Giora Eiland.

The debriefings show that from April 20 onward, there were warnings about several different kinds of possible attacks. These included a combined assault on Kerem Shalom, which would involve a diversionary attack; the digging of a tunnel laden with explosives; an attack between the Sufa crossing and Absan, to the north of the point where the attack actually took place; and an attack through Sinai.

The warnings became more focused June 24, following the arrest of two Hamas operatives near Khan Yunis by an elite Israel Defense Forces unit the night before. The Shin Bet investigation into Shalit's abduction subsequently concluded that one of these two Hamas detainees had been actively involved in planning the attack.

On June 25, at 5:25 A.M., the Shin Bet delivered an even sharper version of its warning, once again emphasizing that the attack was "imminent." But by then, Hamas had already penetrated the fence: That happened at about 4:45 A.M., via a tunnel. At 5:13 A.M., the first mortar shells exploded, and small arms were fired at IDF positions along the fence. By 5:21 A.M., the terrorists were on their way back to Gaza, with Shalit.

An analysis of the timetable of events reveals that three minutes elapsed between the first reports of an attack and the first response, which involved both ground units and the launching of attack helicopters. At 5:27 A.M., 14 minutes after the initial report of the attack, two fatalities were reported, both members of Shalit's tank crew.

By 6:25 A.M., the reports spoke of two dead outside the tank and two other crew members trapped inside. This was a mistake, because only one crew member was lying injured in the tank. By then, Shalit had been in the Gaza Strip for about an hour.

Only at 6:41 A.M. did the commander of the Desert Patrol Battalion declare "Hannibal," the code-word for an abducted soldier, and a scout unit entered Gaza to search for tracks only at 8:07 A.M.

An elite rescue team arrived at the scene at 9:18 A.M., and at 9:52 A.M., tracks left by the militants and the abducted soldier were located on the Gaza side of the fence.

Only later, after an analysis of radio communications and photographs taken by still cameras along the fence, did it become clear that the militants had returned to Gaza with Shalit as early as 5:21 A.M.
_________________
A la guerre comme a la guerre или вторая редакция Забугорнова